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By William Safire

WASHINGTON, June 28-"I'm the President." Mr. Carter felt it neces sary to say in his latest press conference; "I make the decisions.

This plaintive note came in response. to a growing feeling in the nation that. the man who occupies the Oval Office does not occupy the Presidency: Never in our history has a split between the State Department and the National Security Council been so profound, and the President's natural inclination to paper over the difference has led him into hard-line speeches one week and soft-line press conferences the next.

Even more disturbing than this wide-swinging vacillation is the evidence from the press conference that the President is unaware of what is w going on in his Administration on the most sensitive foreign affairs matters....

For example, members of Mr. Brzeziński's N.S.C. staff have been questioning the approval of the sale of advanced-technology (onl-drilling equipment to the Soviet Union. "If they want us to bail them out of their energy problem," one hard-liner told Richard Burt of The New York Times, "we should force them to pay a price."

The "price" would be linked to the willingness of the Soviets to curb their takeover of Africa — if we see no restraint there from them, then they'll get no high-quality drill bits produced by Dresser Industries of Texas from. us. This tit-for-tat pressure, which is a the only language tough-minded Soviets understand, is viewed with shock and horror by Cy-Vance's State Department

When asked about this suggestion, widely known in Washington, to tie our technology sales to Soviet conduct.

Mr. Carter drew a blank. I've not. heard that proposal you describe." hetold the incredulous reporters. He then enunciated a policy which, if time, is an indictment of his competence as a negotiator: "We've never held out the prospect of increased or decreased trade if they did or did not do a certain thing that we thought was best."

With his own N.S.C. actively propos ing such long-overdue pressure - both within the Administration and to reporters — the President of the United ? States professes that he has "not heard that proposal." Hard to believe.

The second example, even more startling, has to do with a visit to Capitol Hill made by Stansfield Turner, Di-

by Martin Schramm of Newsday was: "The C.I.A. Director, Mr. Turner, o present a document, a written plan in Senator Clark...the plan called for sending arms to a third country, to the rebel forces in Angola. Did you know about the meeting? Did you know about that document? And since others around the Administration did. would you have approved it?"

In the grand tradition of President Warren Gamaliel Harding, Mr. Carter replied, "I didn't have any idea that the C.I.A. Director had even talked to Senator Clark about it."

Let that sink in: Here is the President's covert operations chief going to the super-dove Senator whose amendment hamstrings our ability to counter Soviet-Cuban aggression in Africa, presenting the Senator with a plan-to. send in arms through a third countryand the President tells us, "I had no

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knowledge of that nor have I every tended to send weapons to Angola; di-وسينيد به التوالي rectly or indirectly

The truth is that the Special Coordi nation Committee (Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, Turner) met on April 7 to see what could be done in Angola; to weeks later, Admiral Turner was told to approach Senator Clark. The C.P.R. chief, took a one-pages 12-sentence proposal, with him. The Senator tests me he assumed at the time that the President had been aware of the proposal.

Believe it or not, President Carter now insists he read about this plan in the newspapers, with absolutely no foreknowledge, and assumed - after the fact - that his Director of Central Intelligence was just trying to find out the meaning of the Clark amendments

Then what was Stansfield Turner doing, with written indirect-aid plabric hand, in Senator Clark's office? Plays ing rogue elephant? Or did the President's top four advisers, who okay the presentation of the plan to the Senator, think that keeping the President in the dark would give Mr. Carlet the opportunity for what used to be called "plausible denial!" 3-3-3-3-3-3-3-3

In both the technology linkage and the indirect-aid proposal, either Presidents Carter is not telling the third about being totally unaware of these two hawkish plans, or he really does not know what is going on in the White House. When he claims he "never cos templated's indirect aid to opponents of Moscow's Angola puppet - despite proof that such a plan was presented in his name to a key senator by his top aides - then he is either devious pr dangerously uninformed.

That is why he has to assure us. "I'm the President, I make the decisions. " In fact, he is repeating "He to himself, every time he changes him. mind, and even Jimmy Carter must be rector, of Central Intelligence, last having his doubts about his ability to STAT

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